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I.

INTRODUCTION

While an overarching policy of the American judicial system is to adjudicate disputes
on their merits, the system may work most efficiently when most disputes are settled
between the opposing parties on terms of their own choosing.1 In modern dispute
resolution, lawsuits are rarely taken to the fact finder, and most organizational clients are
generally unwilling to accept the risk and uncertainty of a jury trial, preferring instead to
work towards a reasonable settlement of disputes.2 Consequently, the availability of
dispositive motions—such as motions for summary judgment—plays a large role in
determining the settlement value of claims by potentially reducing the anticipated cost to
defend a lawsuit.3 This relationship comes into sharp focus for organizational clients
worried by the prospect of bearing the aggregate cost of fully litigating many disputes.4
Due to the effects on settlement value, an organizational client faced with the
decision of whether to remove to federal court a lawsuit filed against it in state court should

J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Tennessee College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Judy
Cornett and Professor Paula Schaefer for their comments, feedback, and continued support.
1 See Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement,
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 286, 288 (1999); Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and
the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 9-10 (1996).
2 See John Barkai, Elizabeth Kent & Pamela Martin, A Profile of Settlement, 42 CT. REV. 34, 34 (2006).
Of course, in certain circumstances, some organizational clients may prefer not to settle for the
purpose of trying to set favorable precedents or avoiding developing a reputation as an easy target for
lawsuits. See David Stringer & Betsey Rader, Top Ten Considerations When Deciding Whether to Settle an
Employment
Dispute,
ASSOCIATION
OF
CORPORATE
COUNSEL
(Apr.
1,
2011),
http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/topten/Employment-Dispute.cfm.
3 See Edward Brunet, The Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 689, 690, 692 (2012)
(explaining the strong connection between summary judgment and settlement value).
4 See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60
DUKE L.J. 765, 772–77 (2010) (noting that litigation costs may feel relatively greater and less
proportionate to the value of the case than they may actually be).
*
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consider the differing summary judgment standards.5 However, the state of summary
judgment in Tennessee is currently unsettled.6 The Tennessee state legislature has passed
new laws attempting to alter the prevailing standard; however, no state appellate court has
yet interpreted the statutes, and some commentators recognize the possibility of a
constitutional attack on their validity.7
In anticipation of a state appellate court decision concerning the legislation, this
article aims to briefly examine the recent statutes attempting to change the law of summary
judgment in Tennessee, the possible practical effects of the statutes on the summary
judgment standard, and the corresponding consequences for organizational defendants in
determining whether to remove lawsuits to federal court. Part II of this article provides an
overview of the prior standard for summary judgment in Tennessee. Part III discusses how
the statutes depart from the prior standard. Finally, Part IV outlines possible appellate court
treatments of the statutes and how various treatments would affect removal considerations
for organizational clients.
II.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN TENNESSEE STATE COURTS PRIOR TO JULY 1, 2012

For cases filed in Tennessee state court before July 1, 2011, meeting the standard for
summary judgment was more difficult than in federal court.8 Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 56.04, like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, provides for a grant of summary
judgment where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”9 Under Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., the most
See Daniel E. Reidy, Comparison with Commercial Litigation in State Courts, in 1 BUSINESS AND
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS 771, 784-86 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2011)
(noting the importance of differences in state and federal procedural rules when considering whether
to litigate in state or federal court). Of course, this consideration is applicable only to the extent
grounds for removal exist. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446 (2012).
6 See Donald F. Paine, Can the General Assembly Overrule Supreme Court Rules?, 47-DEC TENN. B.J. 37
(Dec. 2011) (noting the uncertainty created by the enactment of TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-311(e)
and 20-16-101).
7 See id. While Tennessee appellate courts have not yet ruled on the validity of the statutes, they have
certainly taken note of them. See, e.g., Sykes v. Chattanooga Hous. Auth., 343 S.W.3d 18, 25 n.2, 26
n.4, 29 n.5 (Tenn. 2011) (noting that TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-101, 4-21-311(e), and 50-1-304(g)
did not apply to the case); White v. Target Corp., No. W2010–02372–COA–R3–CV, 2012 WL
6599814, at *5 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2012) (noting that TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-16-101 did
not apply to the case); Skann v. Fed. Exp. Corp., No. W2011–01807–COA–R3–CV, 2012 WL
6212891, at *4 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2012) (noting that TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-101, 4-21311(e), and 50-1-304(g) did not apply to the case).
8 See Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tenn. 2008) (Koch, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Hannan “dramatically chang[ed] the moving party’s burden of production” at the summary judgment
stage); Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Bye Bye Hannan?, 47-AUG TENN. B.J. 14, 16 (Aug. 2011) (noting
that, before the enactment of TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-16-101, “winning a motion for summary
judgment [in Tennessee state court] was more challenging” than in federal court).
9 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.04.
5
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recent Tennessee Supreme Court case interpreting Rule 56.04, the burden rested on the
party moving for summary judgment to “affirmatively negate an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s claim” or to show that “the nonmoving party cannot establish an
essential element of the claim at trial.”10 When adopting this standard, the Tennessee
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the federal “put up or shut up” standard first announced
in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.11 The Supreme Court of the United States, in Celotex and its
companion cases, held that a party moving for summary judgment on a claim can point to a
lack of admissible evidence supporting an essential element of that claim12 and that the court
may consider the quantity of evidence as it relates to the burden of proof in considering
whether summary judgment is proper.13 That is, under Celotex, the plaintiff must present
affirmative evidence to support its claims at the summary judgment stage to continue to
trial.14
Hannan, however, took the opposite approach, allowing summary judgment only
when the moving party affirmatively negated an essential element of the claim or
demonstrated that the plaintiff could not prove its case “at trial.”15 Therefore, the plaintiff,
in the absence of the negation of an essential element, had no obligation to come forth with
affirmative evidence in support of its claims at the summary judgment stage.16
Consequently, Tennessee state courts, operating under the rule in Hannan, became more
favorable for plaintiffs than federal courts. A claim not supported by any affirmative
evidence could still survive a motion for summary judgment so long as the moving party did
not negate an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim or could not show that proving
the claim at trial would be impossible.17
Further, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in Gossett v. Tractor Supply, Inc., held that the
pervasive standard for summary judgment in employment cases, specifically the burden
Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 6, 7.
Id.; see also Blumstein, supra note 8, at 15; Judy M. Cornett, Trick or Treat? Summary Judgment in
Tennessee After Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 77 TENN. L. REV. 305, 305 (2010).
12 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
13 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-53 (1986). However, the Court clearly stated
that the trial judge may not evaluate the credibility of evidence in determining whether proffered
evidence is sufficient to meet the relevant evidentiary burden. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
14 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. However, the plaintiff’s evidence does not necessarily have to be
admissible. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
15 Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 7 (emphasis added). Compare Blumstein, supra note 8, at 16 (noting the
difficulty of proving such a negative), with Cornett, supra note 11, at 339-40 (arguing that summary
judgment under Hannan is possible, due to its “elegant burden-shifting procedure”).
16 See Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 6-7. There are many circumstances where both Hannan and Celotex will
provide for a grant of summary judgment. See Cornett, supra note 11, at 344. However, this piece will
focus primarily on the differences between the standards, which arise out of Hannan’s “at trial”
requirement.
17 See Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 6-7.
10
11
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shifting mechanics of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, was incompatible with the Tennessee law of
summary judgment set out in Hannan.18 The burden-shifting framework of McDonnell
Douglas and its progeny allows for summary judgment where a plaintiff cannot prove that a
defendant-employer’s proffered non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason for termination
was pretextual.19 The mechanics of McDonnell Douglas work in three steps: first, the plaintiff
must offer prima facie evidence of discrimination; second, the defendant may then offer
evidence of a non-discriminatory motive; third, the plaintiff must then show that the
defendant’s offered non-discriminatory motive was merely pretextual.20 In the context of a
motion for summary judgment, McDonnell Douglas allows a defendant to succeed in its
motion if the plaintiff cannot come forth with affirmative evidence showing pretext.21
Reasoning that summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas framework “does
not preclude the possibility that a discriminatory or retaliatory motive played a role in the
discharge decision,” the Tennessee Supreme Court held in Gossett that McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting does not comport with the standard for summary judgment set out in
Hannan.22 Gossett further held that summary judgment in employment cases was proper
when a reasonable person could find only in favor of the movant after “‘tak[ing] the
strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow[ing] all
reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard[ing] all countervailing evidence.’”23
Logically, this must mean that a court cannot consider a defendant-employer’s
nondiscriminatory explanation of an action—it must disregard it as countervailing evidence.
Further, as the court is bound to give as much credence as it can to a plaintiff’s allegation of
discrimination or retaliation, it must deny summary judgment so long as proving
discrimination or retaliation at trial is theoretically possible—even where an employer has
presented a nondiscriminatory explanation.24
As an employer’s offering of a

Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777, 782-85 (Tenn. 2010). However, the Tennessee
Supreme Court, in Gossett, also recognized the validity of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework to trials, limiting its opinion to the applicability of the standard at the summary judgment
stage. Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 783.
19 See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973); Risch v. Royal Oak Police Dep’t, 581 F.3d 383, 390 (6th Cir.
2009) (applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting at the summary judgment stage); Geiger v. Tower
Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 620, 622-23 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting at the
summary judgment stage); Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting at the summary judgment stage).
20 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04.
21 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04; Risch, 581 F.3d at 390; Geiger,
579 F.3d at 622; Henry Filters, 505 F.3d at 523-24.
22 Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 782.
23 Id. at 784 (quoting Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Tenn. 2004)) (emphasis added).
24 See Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tenn. 2008) (holding that summary judgment is
improper where the movant has not affirmatively negated an essential element of the nonmovant’s
18
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nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory motive does not shift the burden of production to the
plaintiff at the summary judgment stage, it becomes relatively harder for defendants to
effectively respond to a facially sufficient allegation of discrimination or retaliation at the
summary judgment stage under Hannan and Gossett.25 Consequently, the Gossett decision
limited the possibility of summary judgment in employment cases where the plaintiff alleged
discrimination or retaliation.26
Whether or not this result is desirable from a policy standpoint,27 it likely has an
effect on the settlement equities of discrimination and retaliation claims adjudicated in
Tennessee state courts. If summary judgment were to be granted more often in employment
cases, as it would ostensibly be under McDonnell Douglas, then plaintiffs with relatively weak
claims should be more likely to settle those claims—and at a lower cost—than they would
otherwise be because of the increased risk.28 Indeed, to the extent plaintiffs in employment
cases have avoided removal by alleging only state claims in Tennessee courts, they have likely
used the difference in the federal and state standards to raise the settlement value of their
claims.29 Of course, the same reasoning also applies, in reverse, to defendants. To the
extent organizational defendants in employment cases have removed these cases to federal

claim); see also Blumstein, supra note 8, at 16 (recognizing the difficulty of affirmatively proving such a
negative).
25 Indeed, under the Gossett regime, as long as a plaintiff alleges a legally valid claim of discrimination
or retaliation, summary judgment will be improper unless the underlying necessary facts cannot
possibly be proven at trial or the movant is able to affirmatively negate an essential element of the
claim. See Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 7. However, as the court applying Hannan cannot consider
countervailing evidence, it seems unlikely that the standard could be met in employment cases with
similar frequency to the Celotex standard because plaintiffs having otherwise valid claims but no
evidence to support pretext would survive summary judgment.
26 The Gossett court claims that it “does not . . . make obtaining summary judgment ‘needlessly more
difficult’ in employment discrimination and retaliation cases.” Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 785. However,
the court also recognizes that the decision does make obtaining summary judgment in employment
cases more difficult than it would be if Tennessee were to operate under McDonnell Douglas. See
Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 784-85.
27 Commentators on both sides of this issue have come forth with strong, persuasive arguments. See
Brunett, supra note 3, at 691-93 (arguing that a broader summary judgment rule works to develop the
law and facts of cases and helps to promote settlement); Cornett, supra note 11, at 343-44 (arguing
that the Hannan standard rightfully places the burden on the movant, as the party that wants the
lawsuit to come to an early conclusion).
28 See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: Dealing with the Possible but not Certain, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 337, 348-49 (2011) (describing plaintiffs’ attorneys’ valuation of claims as a process
of managing and assessing risk).
29 See Edward G. Phillips, ‘Gossett’ Eschews Employers’ Reliance on ‘McDonnell Douglas’ in Summary
Judgment, 47-FEB TENN. B.J. 24, 25-26 (Feb. 2011) (“[P]laintiffs’ counsel will become more likely to
plead state law causes of action exclusively, foregoing the corresponding federal claim, so as to defeat
removal on federal question grounds.”).
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court, they have likely used the difference in the standards to lower their settlement value. 30
Therefore, the availability of removal can greatly affect the settlement value of a case—
especially the closer a case comes to being ripe for summary judgment under the Celotex and
McDonnell Douglas standards.
III.

THE NEW STATUTES CHANGING TENNESSEE SUMMARY JUDGMENT LAW

In response to the existing summary judgment law of Hannan and Gossett, the
Tennessee General Assembly, in 2011, enacted Public Chapter No. 498 and Public Chapter
No. 461, codified at sections 20-16-101, 4-21-311(e), and 50-1-304(g) of the Tennessee Code
Annotated.31 Both statutes were designed to change Tennessee summary judgment law to
comport with the federal standard.32
Section 20-16-101 provides that, for claims filed after July 1, 2011, summary
judgment is proper where the moving party “[s]ubmits affirmative evidence that negates an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim” or “[d]emonstrates to the court that the
nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s claim.”33 While negating an essential element of a claim would satisfy the
Hannan standard, the inclusion of language in the statute that allows for summary judgment
on the basis of insufficient evidence attempts to legislatively overrule Hannan’s rejection of
the Celotex line of cases.34 Indeed, the language of section 20-16-101 provides for a grant of
summary judgment where “the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an
essential element of [its] claim.”35 This runs directly counter to Hannan’s “at trial” standard;
under the statute, a party can successfully move for summary judgment—even where the
nonmovant could still prevail at trial—if sufficient evidence has not yet been brought forth
to support the nonmovant’s claims.36

See id. at 25 (providing that upon the ruling in Gossett, “employment discrimination and retaliation
cases in Tennessee [state courts] just became much more expensive for employers to defend and to
settle”).
31 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 461; 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 498. For a more thorough and detailed account
of the legislative history of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-16-101, see Judy M. Cornett &
Matthew R. Lyon, Redefining Summary Judgment by Statute: The Legislative History of Tennessee Code Annotated
Section 20-16-101, 8 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 100 (2012).
32 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 498 (“[T]he purpose of this legislation is to overrule the summary judgment
standard for parties who do not bear the burden of proof at trial set forth in Hannan v. Alltel
Publishing Co., its progeny, and the cases relied on in Hannan[.]”); Blumstein, supra note 8, at 16, 18
(noting a deleted amendment that stated the purpose of the statutes was to “‘expressly reject and
legislatively overrule’” Gossett).
33 TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-16-101 (2012).
34 See id.; 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 498 (purporting to “overrule the summary judgment standard . . . set
forth in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., its progeny, and the cases relied on in Hannan”).
35 TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-16-101.
36 See Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tenn. 2008).
30
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Sections 4-21-311(e) and 50-1-304(g), effective as of June 10, 2011, apply a burdenshifting framework to state statutory and common law claims of “intentional discrimination
or retaliation.”37 Under the statutes, the plaintiff has “the burden of establishing a prima
facie case of intentional discrimination.”38 If the plaintiff pleads a prima facie case, then a
“presumption of discrimination or retaliation” arises, and the burden shifts to “the
defendant to produce evidence that one . . . or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
existed for the challenged employment action.”39 If the defendant comes forth with the
required evidence, then the presumption is rebutted, and “the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to demonstrate that the reason given by the defendant was not the true reason for the
challenged employment action and that the stated reason was a pretext for illegal
discrimination or retaliation.”40 Further, the General Assembly provided that this burdenshifting framework “shall apply at all stages of the proceedings, including motions for
summary judgment.”41 For practical purposes, this standard laid out in sections 4-21-311(e)
and 50-1-304(g) is the same as in McDonnell Douglas.42 Insofar as the statutes apply burden
shifting at the summary judgment stage, they directly conflict with Gossett and reflect an
attempt by the General Assembly to abrogate the decision.43
IV.

POSSIBLE TREATMENTS OF THE NEW STATUTES AND THE CORRESPONDING
EFFECTS ON REMOVAL CONSIDERATIONS

As there have been no Tennessee appellate court decisions construing or applying
sections 20-16-101, 4-21-311(e), or 50-1-304(g), the effect of the statutes—both in validity
and interpretation—has not yet been determined.44 Indeed, as the Tennessee Supreme
Court ultimately determines whether the statutes comport with state law, the question as to
the statutes’ validity may remain unanswered, at least definitively, for some time yet.
However, the Tennessee Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have taken note of the new
statutes and a case construing the statutes seems to be nearing.45 Accordingly, several
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-311(e), 50-1-304(g) (2012).
Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Compare TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-311(e), 50-1-304(g) (laying out three-phase burden-shifting
scheme), with Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (outlining the
McDonnell Douglas three-phase burden-shifting scheme).
43 See Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tenn. 2010); see also Blumstein, supra note
8, at 18. However, beyond summary judgment, the effect of TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-311(e) and
50-1-304(g) is minimal. Gossett explicitly provided that McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting is proper at
trial and for purposes of directed verdict. Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 783.
44 See Paine, supra note 6, at 37 (recognizing a separation of powers issue with the enactment of the
new statutes).
45 See cases cited supra note 7.
37
38
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possibilities exist as to the ultimate effect the statutes will have, and these possibilities entail
different effects on removal considerations for organizational defendants.
A.

Validation of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-16-101, 4-21-311(e), and 50-1-304(g)

One possible outcome, of course, is that sections 20-16-101, 4-21-311(e), and 50-1304(g) will be found valid.46 The issue then would be how to interpret them. One likely
interpretation, and the one most supported by the text of the statutes, is that the statutes run
co-extensively with the Celotex and McDonnell Douglas lines of cases.47 To the extent that the
Celotex and McDonnell Douglas standards are applied in Tennessee state courts, the motivation
for plaintiffs to guard against removal by filing employment actions based only on common
law or state statutes, when federal claims may also be available, merely to gain a more
favorable summary judgment standard, will no longer exist.48 That is, plaintiffs in
employment cases will no longer have to take into account the difference in summary
judgment standards when deciding whether to plead in a way to avoid removal. This may
increase the number of removable claims brought and thus also increase organizational
defendants’ need to consider whether removal is beneficial.49
Likewise, when an organizational defendant faces a state court lawsuit where
removal is possible, the existence of similar, if not identical, summary judgment standards in
state and federal courts may significantly alter the removal decision.50 The focus of removal
considerations then turns to other issues such as the relative costs of litigating in state and
federal court, the existence of broader or more narrow geographic areas from which juries
are pooled, local sentiment towards the organization, the differences in the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, the relevant differences in procedural rules
and local rules, the size of the dockets, and, perhaps, the possibility of appearing before a
seemingly sympathetic judge.51 Depending on venue and the client’s goals and strategies in
the litigation, several of these points may weigh against removal even if it is an option.52
Thus, from the defendants’ standpoint, Tennessee state court becomes more attractive than
it would be if still operating under Hannan and Gossett, and deciding against removal becomes
a more viable option.

To the same ends, the Tennessee Supreme Court could consent to the legislation. See State v.
Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 480-82 (Tenn. 2001).
47 See Blumstein, supra note 8, at 16-17; Paine, supra note 6, at 37.
48 Of course, other considerations may lead plaintiffs to eschew federal claims in the hopes of
avoiding removal. See Reidy, supra note 5, at 771-97 (outlining factors in determining whether to file
in federal or state court).
49 See Phillips, supra note 29, at 25-26 (arguing that Gossett incentivized plaintiffs to plead in ways that
avoided removal).
50 See Reidy, supra note 5, at 784-86.
51 See id. at 771-97.
52 See id.
46
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Successful Challenges to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-16-101, 4-21-311(e), and 50-1-304(g)

However, the validity of sections 20-16-101, 4-21-311(e), and 50-1-304(g), at least as
a matter of state law, is not firmly established.53 Already, some commentators have noted
that the statutes may be susceptible to an attack based on the Tennessee Constitution.54 In
so far as the legislature changed the procedure of Tennessee courts, the statutes were
enacted under an atypical process of rulemaking. The Tennessee Supreme Court, not the
General Assembly, typically promulgates rules governing the procedure of Tennessee state
courts.55 Further, in State v. Mallard, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that:
The authority of the General Assembly . . . is not unlimited, and any
exercise of [rule enacting] power by the legislature must inevitably yield
when it seeks to govern the practice and procedure of the courts. Only
the Supreme Court has the inherent power to promulgate rules governing
the practice and procedure of the courts of this state . . . .56
The court also noted that “the power to control the practice and procedure of the courts is
inherent in the judiciary and necessary ‘to engage in the complete performance of the judicial
function,’”57 and thus, “this power cannot be constitutionally exercised by any other branch
of government.”58
Sections 20-16-101, 4-21-311(e), and 50-1-304(g) may run afoul of this doctrine.59
Section 20-16-101 specifically sets out to change summary judgment law,60 a topic governed
by the Tennessee Supreme Court and generally thought of as procedural.61 Likewise,
sections 4-21-311(e) and 50-1-304(g) change the law of summary judgment as it relates to
Some commentators argue that the Celotex and McDonnell Douglas standards severely weaken the
right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, see, e.g., Suja A.
Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 145-50 (2007). However, the
Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial has not been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment so as to apply to the states. See Minn. & S. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 219
(1916).
54 Judy M. Cornett & Matthew R. Lyon, Contested Elections as Secret Weapon: Legislative Control Over Judicial
Decision-Making, 75 ALB. L. REV. 2091, 2095-98 (2012); Paine, supra note 6, at 37.
55 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-402 (2012).
56 State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 480-81 (Tenn. 2001) (citing TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-401, -02
(1994) and State v. Reid, 981 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1998)).
57 Id. at 481 (quoting Anderson Cnty. Quarterly Court v. Judges of the 28th Judicial Cir., 579 S.W.2d
875, 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978)).
58 Id. (citing TENN. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“No person or persons belonging to one of these departments
shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in the cases herein
directed or permitted.”)).
59 For a more thorough and detailed discussion of the constitutionality of the statutes than space
herein will allow, see Cornett & Lyon, supra note 54, at 2098-118.
60 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-16-101.
61 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-402; TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.
53
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discrimination and retaliation claims.62 Therefore, to the extent sections 20-16-101, 4-21311(e) and 50-1-304(g) encroach upon the Tennessee judiciary’s control of court practice
and procedure, they may be struck down as violating the Tennessee Constitution on a
separation of powers basis.63
If the statutes are struck down, then Hannah and Gossett would remain the law of
summary judgment in Tennessee. Accordingly, the status quo would remain intact.
Organizational clients faced with the possibility of removal would likely retain the same
decision-making process as they do now: in cases where Celotex would possibly provide for a
grant of summary judgment, or in employment cases where the client has evidence of a nondiscriminatory or non-retaliatory motive, removal would likely have a great impact on the
settlement equities of the case in favor of the organizational defendant.64 In the absence of
countervailing circumstances, the client would probably benefit from removing all possible
claims to federal court. However, plaintiffs will likewise benefit from avoiding removal in
these cases and will therefore likely draft their complaints accordingly.65
C.

Validation of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-311(e) and 50-1-304(g) but a Successful Challenge to
Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101

Perhaps the most conceptually interesting and nuanced of the possible results would
be the invalidation of section 20-16-101 but not sections 4-21-311(e) and 50-1-304(g).66
There is at least some reason to believe that this may occur. The rules set forth in sections
4-21-311(e) and 50-1-304(g), which apply only to employment discrimination and retaliation
claims, are much narrower than section 20-16-101, which applies to all instances of summary
judgment.67 While a narrowly-tailored rule may still “seek[] to govern the practice and
procedure of the courts,” the likelihood of a violation of the separation of powers doctrine
would seem to decrease the less the rule infringes into the realm of the judiciary.68 Also, as a
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-311(e), 50-1-304(g).
See Cornett & Lyon, supra note 54, at 2116 (arguing that the statutes “clearly exceed[]” the General
Assembly’s legislative power).
64 See Amy M. Pepke, Prove It, 43-JUL TENN. B.J. 12, 14 (July 2007) (noting the favorability of the
Hannan standard to plaintiffs); Phillips, supra note 29, at 25 (arguing that Gossett makes “employment
discrimination and retaliation cases in Tennessee . . . much more expensive for employers to defend
and to settle”).
65 See Phillips, supra note 29, at 25-26.
66 There seems to be no reason to consider the possible invalidation of TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21311(e) and 50-1-304(g) and the validation or adoption of § 20-16-101. Section 20-16-101, as a statute
that applies to all summary judgments, represents a greater intrusion on the power of the judiciary
than §§ 4-21-311(e) and 50-1-304(g), which apply only to employment cases. Further, as the decision
in Gossett was based directly on Hannan, adopting § 20-16-101 would, in effect, remove the court’s
basis for rejecting the McDonnell Douglas standard. See Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777,
783 (Tenn. 2010).
67 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-311(e), 20-16-101, 50-1-304(g).
68 State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tenn. 2001).
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basic principle, the court will “give all legislative enactments a strong presumption of
constitutionality,” especially in analyzing this sort of separation of powers issue.69
Further, the Mallard court expressed a commitment to “considerations of interbranch comity.”70 To that end, the court could also “consent[] to the application of
procedural . . . rules promulgated by the legislature.”71 On these grounds, the court may
decide to recognize sections 4-21-311(e) and 50-1-304(g).72 Of course, it follows from this
that the court may decide not to recognize 20-16-101, especially as it attempts to overrule a
more broad legal decision than sections 4-21-311(e) and 50-1-304(g).
If the court strikes down section 20-16-101 and upholds or acquiesces in sections 421-311(e) and 50-1-304(g), the retention of the Hannan standard and an adoption of a
burden-shifting paradigm like McDonnell Douglas would result, effectively returning Tennessee
summary judgment law to a pre-Gossett state.73 To a large extent, however, the practical
effect of such a determination is unclear. One possible solution would be to apply McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting wholesale by creating a carve-out in Tennessee summary judgment
jurisprudence for employment discrimination and retaliation cases. As the court recognized
in Gossett that McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting is incompatible with the Hannan standard,74
a carve-out seems to be the only way to preserve the Hannan standard intact—albeit on a
somewhat limited basis—while still applying the burden-shifting of sections 4-21-311(e) and
50-1-304(g).75
Alternatively, the ultimate solution may be for the court to employ a narrow reading
of sections 4-21-311(e) and 50-1-304(g). The Mallard court employed such a tactic, applying
a construction of a statute narrowly enough that it would not violate the Tennessee
Constitution.76 However, the court noted that this interpretive process has as its boundaries
the ways in which “a statute can legitimately be construed.”77 As sections 4-21-311(e) and
50-1-304(g) purport to directly change the law of summary judgment in clear terms,
however, it seems that any such reasonable construction applying the burden-shifting laid

Id. at 483.
Id. at 482.
71 Id. at 481.
72 For a discussion of the political considerations that the court may make in deciding whether to
acquiesce in the statutes, see Cornett & Lyon, supra note 54, at 2118-22.
73 See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-311(e), 50-1-304(g) (limiting their scope to discrimination and
retaliation claims).
74 Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tenn. 2010).
75 See id. at 782 (holding that McDonnell Douglas-type burden-shifting is incompatible with Hannan).
76 Mallard, 40 S.W.3d at 483.
77 Id. at 480 (citing Marion Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Marion Cnty. Election Comm’n 594 S.W.2d 681,
684-85 (Tenn. 1980)).
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out in the statute must also apply to summary judgment.78 Ultimately, the court will have to
determine exactly what solution to this problem to employ.79
If the court strikes down section 20-16-101 but upholds or acquiesces in sections 421-311(e) and 50-1-304(g), at least one clear conclusion, in terms of removal considerations,
emerges in any scenario: for organizational defendants in non-employment cases, federal
court would still hold the more favorable summary judgment standard.80 That is,
organizational defendants faced with removable lawsuits not concerning discrimination or
retaliation would be able to access the more favorable Celotex standard by removing to
federal court.81 While other considerations as to removal certainly exist,82 this places a large
thumb on the scale in favor of removing, especially when considering the effect that a
successful summary judgment motion could have on the settlement value of a case.
However, the specific effect on removal considerations in employment
discrimination or retaliation cases is hard to discern and depends in large part on the exact
standard the court applies. In the case of a carve-out for employment cases, where
McDonnell Douglas would apply to discrimination and retaliation claims but Hannan would
apply to all other claims, organizational defendants would not gain access to a more
beneficial summary judgment standard by removing employment discrimination or
retaliation claims because the standards would be substantially similar in state and federal
court.83 However, if discrimination or retaliation claims were joined with other claims that
do not fall under McDonnell Douglas, then removal would allow organizational defendants to
avoid the Hannan standard on the non-employment claims.84 The consideration would then
become one of calculating the relative values of the discrimination and retaliation claims and
the non-McDonnell Douglas claims and balancing them against the costs of removal.85 If there
is no carve-out and the Tennessee Supreme Court adopts narrow readings of sections 4-21311(e) and 50-1-304(g), the effects on removal considerations appear murky and would
See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-311(e), 50-1-304(g). If the statutes could be limited so as not to
apply to summary judgment, this would not change the Gossett ruling. See Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 783
(stating that McDonnell Douglas shifting still properly applies to trial).
79 See Paine, supra note 6, at 37 (noting that “it will take a Tennessee Supreme Court opinion to resolve
the issue”).
80 See Pepke, supra note 64, at 14 (contrasting Celotex with Hannan).
81 See Booth Family Trust v. Jefferies, 640 F.3d 134, 140 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that federal law
applies to summary judgment in federal court under vertical choice of law principles).
82 See Reidy, supra note 5, at 771-97 (outlining factors in determining whether state court or federal
court would be more favorable).
83 See sources cited supra note 42 and accompanying text.
84 See Booth Family Trust, 640 F.3d at 140 (holding that the federal summary judgment standard applies
to claims based on diversity jurisdiction).
85 Reidy, supra note 5, at 771-97 (outlining factors in determining whether state court or federal court
would be more favorable).
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largely depend on the exact reading given. However, as any possible narrow reading would
weaken the burden-shifting structure of McDonnell Douglas—and it is hard to suppose that
such a reading would not weaken the standard—organizational defendants of discrimination
or retaliation claims would still gain favorable treatment by removing wherever possible.
Further, given the uncertainty of the state of the law and the limited window for removal, 86
prudent organizational clients would likely begin the process for removal now—if removal is
available—and wait for a non-removable test case to settle these issues.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Tennessee Supreme Court must ultimately sort out the complexities of a
constitutional challenge to sections 20-16-101, 4-21-311(e), and 50-1-304(g) under the
separation of powers doctrine. The statutes are good news for organizational defendants, as
they would establish a considerably more favorable summary judgment standard generally—
and especially in employment discrimination and retaliation cases.87 If the statutes are
upheld or consented to by the Tennessee Supreme Court, then removal would be less
attractive for organizational defendants than under the Hannan and Gossett standards.88
Further, as the statutes provide standards substantially similar to the corresponding federal
standards, a major incentive for plaintiffs to avoid pleading federal claims would evaporate.89
However, a substantial chance exists that sections 20-16-101, 4-21-311(e), and 50-1-304(g)
will be held unconstitutional, in which case the status quo would remain.90 Also, if a middle
ground is found, either by upholding only sections 4-21-311(e) and 50-1-304(g) or by giving
the statutes a narrow construction, the effects on removal considerations will be complex
and situation specific.91 Due to the risks of invalidation of the statutes, organizational
defendants that would be inclined to remove a state court case if Hannan and Gossett were to
apply ought to do so—at least until the Tennessee Supreme Court resolves this issue and a
full explication of the prevailing standard can be given.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006) (generally setting a thirty-day time limit on filing for removal after
being served with initial pleading).
87 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
88See supra Part IV-A.
89See Phillips, supra note 29, at 25-26.
90See supra Part IV-B.
91 For a discussion of some possible corresponding effects on removal considerations, see supra Part
IV-C.
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